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Abstract 
 
This dissertation studies the role of peer disclosures in shaping corporate R&D 
investments. Using the online registration of clinical trials in the drug development process, I find 
that a firm’s R&D investments are deterred by disclosures of clinical trial initiation from strong 
rivals but encouraged by disclosures from weak rivals. The cross-sectional analyses suggest that 
the deterrence effect of peer disclosure is stronger when the therapeutic area has a high clinical-
trial success rate, the encouragement effect is stronger when the market has fewer competing firms, 
and both effects are strengthened when the focal firm has a diversified R&D portfolio. Overall, 
my findings suggest that the way a firm reacts to peer disclosure varies with the disclosing firms’ 
relative competitiveness in the R&D race. 
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1.0 Introduction 
Most empirical accounting studies argue that a firm’s disclosure of proprietary information 
will hurt its competitive position, e.g., by creating knowledge spillovers to competitors. However, 
theory suggests that disclosure could also deter competition by signaling competitive advantages, 
such as cost efficiency or leadership in the innovation race (e.g., Hughes and Pae 2015). Few 
empirical studies have documented either of these two potential product market consequences of 
corporate disclosure (Leuz and Wysocki 2016).1  In this paper, I study the role of corporate 
disclosures in shaping peer firms’ research and development (R&D) investments. Firms’ R&D 
investments lie at the heart of technological changes that drive economic growth (e.g., Romer 
1990). Using the online registration of clinical trials in the drug development process, I find that a 
firm can either increase or decrease its R&D investments following competitors’ disclosures of 
interim R&D success. Specifically, a firm’s R&D investments are deterred by disclosures of 
clinical trial initiation from strong competitors but encouraged by disclosures from weak 
competitors. 
My theoretical framework draws on game-theoretical models of the R&D race in industrial 
organization (IO). This literature models the R&D competition as a two-stage race; successful 
completion of the preliminary stage has no intrinsic value but is a prerequisite for beginning work 
on the final stage. The first firm to complete the final stage wins the race and receives the entire 
 
1 Most prior studies examine how disclosure is shaped by product market competition (e.g., Li 2010; Ellis et al. 2012; 
Ali et al. 2014; Huang et al. 2016; Bernard 2016; Li et al. 2018; Cao et al. 2018). 
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prize. 2  Given this structure of the R&D race, a rival’s announcement of preliminary-stage 
completion can have two opposite effects on the investment decision of a focal firm that remains 
in the preliminary stage. On the one hand, peer disclosure of interim success reduces the focal 
firm’s chance of winning, thus discouraging the focal firm from staying in the race (Fudenberg et 
al. 1983; Harris and Vickers 1987; Lippman and McCardle 1987). I call this the deterrence effect 
of peer disclosure. On the other hand, peer disclosure may also encourage the focal firm to increase 
R&D investments to catch up with the rival, because the information revealed in peer disclosure 
can create knowledge spillovers and/or imply the R&D project is more feasible than previously 
expected (Choi 1991; Doraszelski 2003). I call this the encouragement effect of peer disclosure.      
I hypothesize that whether the encouragement effect or the deterrence effect of peer 
disclosure dominates depends on the disclosing rival firm’s R&D strength, for two reasons. First, 
the encouragement effect of peer disclosure will be strengthened when the rival appears weak. 
Firms working on the same R&D project share a common uncertainty over project feasibility. 
Observing a rival’s disclosure of interim success, the focal firm revises upward its own belief about 
the feasibility of the preliminary stage. The weaker the disclosing rival appears, the more 
optimistic is the focal firm’s updated prospect of also completing the preliminary stage, and hence 
the more likely the focal firm will increase its R&D investments in an effort to catch up. Second, 
the deterrence effect of peer disclosure will be strengthened when the rival appears strong. The 
more likely that the rival can successfully complete the final stage, the lower expected payoff the 
focal firm obtains from remaining in the race. Taken together, I hypothesize that the 
encouragement effect dominates when the disclosure of interim R&D success comes from a weak 
 
2 This “winner-takes-all” assumption is consistent with evidence that firms in R&D-intensive industries often compete 
fiercely for the ultimate prize such as a patent. An innovation is only patentable if it is novel when judged relative to 
“prior art”, i.e., all information that has been made available to the public before the patent filing date. 
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rival, which induces the focal firm to subsequently increase its R&D investment in that R&D race. 
In contrast, the deterrence effect likely dominates when the disclosure comes from a strong rival, 
which leads the focal firm to subsequently decrease its R&D investment or even drop out of that 
R&D race. 
The general lack of evidence on the product market consequences of disclosures is partly 
due to data availability issues – firms’ real decisions are usually not directly observable (Leuz and 
Wysocki 2016). To address this empirical challenge, I exploit the empirical setting of 
pharmaceutical R&D. This setting has at least three advantages. First, successful drug development 
is a key driver of commercial success and pharmaceutical companies invest heavily in R&D. In 
2018, worldwide pharmaceutical R&D spending totaled $179 billion or 22% of sales revenue, the 
highest percentage of any industry except semiconductors (EvaluatePharma 2019). In the time of 
a pandemic, drug development becomes critically important for the global economy and public 
health. For example, economists estimate that an effective drug against COVID-19 could restore 
$1 trillion in economic activity (Gottlieb 2020).3 Second, characteristics of pharmaceutical R&D 
map well into the two-stage R&D race widely studied in the IO theories. The drug development 
process consists of two stages – pre-clinical studies, which are done in laboratories and on animals, 
and clinical trials, which further test drug safety and efficacy on human beings. Also, first-to-
market drugs typically enjoy significantly greater market shares than drugs launched later to the 
market, similar to the “winner-takes-all” assumption made in theories on the R&D race (Regnier 
and Ridley 2015). This skewed payoff distribution magnifies the role of information regarding 
firms’ relative positions in the race. Finally, pharmaceutical firms publicly disclose rich data about 
 
3 As of May 2020, more than 120 research teams around the world are working on drugs and vaccines for COVID-19, 
with more than 900 interventional studies (clinical trials) related to COVID-19 registered on ClinicalTrials.gov. 
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clinical trials. Since 2007, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) has required firms to register 
all drug candidates’ later-stage clinical trials on ClinicalTrials.gov, a publicly accessible online 
database.4 These trial registrations provide detailed and timely information about firms’ R&D 
progress and are closely watched by industry peers.  
I hand collected all clinical trials registered by the 50 firms with the largest number of 
clinical trial registrations on ClinicalTrials.gov between 2007 and 2017. To facilitate comparison 
of R&D projects across firms, I classify all clinical trials into 162 “markets”, as new drug 
candidates treating diseases in the same therapeutic area are competing in the same product market. 
This classification allows me to capture R&D investments and R&D race at a more granular level 
than prior studies that rely on firm-year level data. Specifically, I measure a firm’s R&D 
investments at the firm-market-year level using the number of later-stage clinical trials the firm 
conducted and registered online to comply with FDA regulations. Leveraging the fact that gaining 
FDA approval to initiate clinical trials marks the successful completion of pre-clinical studies, I 
capture peer disclosure of interim R&D success using the number of rival firms’ early-stage 
clinical trial registrations in the same market in the two preceding years. I further distinguish 
between a strong and a weak rival using the relative ranking of firms’ accumulated “knowledge 
stock” in that market, measured using the number of clinical trials conducted and registered to 
comply with FDA regulations.  
 
4 Clinical trials account for about 70% of total costs per approved new drug (DiMasi et al. 2016). A new drug candidate 
is typically tested in three phases of clinical trials before it can apply for FDA approval for marketing in the U.S. Phase 
1 trials determine safety and dosing using healthy volunteers; Phase 2 trials evaluate efficacy and further explore 
safety in small numbers of patients with the targeted disease; Phase 3 trials further confirm safety and efficacy in 
larger numbers of patients. Since 2007, firms are required by the FDA to register their clinical trials, starting in Phase 
2, on ClinicalTrials.gov. See Section 4.1 for more discussion.  
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My main findings suggest that a firm’s R&D investments are deterred by disclosures of 
interim R&D success from strong rivals but are encouraged by disclosures from weak rivals. 
Specifically, I find that the focal firm’s initiation of later-stage trials is negatively associated with 
the number of strong rivals’ registration of early-stage trials in the same market in the last two 
years. This result is consistent with peer disclosure of interim success deterring subsequent R&D 
investments by the focal firm. In contrast, the focal firm’s R&D investments are positively 
associated with disclosures by weak rivals, consistent with peer disclosures by weak rivals 
encouraging catch-up behavior by the focal firm. The economic magnitude of both effects is 
significant. When a firm’s strong (weak) rivals increase their last two years’ disclosure of early-
stage trials by one standard deviation, the expected log-odds of the focal firm conducting later-
stage trials in the same therapeutic area drops by 18.9% (increases by 15.4%).  
I further conduct three cross-sectional analyses to identify situations that strengthen the 
encouragement and/or deterrence effects of peer disclosure. First, I hypothesize and find that in 
therapeutic areas with a higher clinical-trial success rate, the association between a focal firm’s 
R&D investments and its strong rivals’ disclosures of early-stage trial initiation is more negative. 
This result is consistent with the deterrence effect of strong rivals’ disclosure being strengthened 
when tasks in later stages of the R&D race are expected to be more feasible. Second, the 
encouragement effect of weak rivals’ disclosures is more pronounced in markets with fewer 
competing firms, presumably because the existence of fewer rivals increases the focal firm’s 
prospects of defeating its rivals in later stages of the R&D race. Third, both the deterrence and 
encouragement effect of peer disclosure are strengthened when the focal firm has a diversified 
R&D portfolio, consistent with greater flexibility in resource allocation making the focal firm more 
responsive to new information.  
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In supplementary analyses, I first show that my main results are unlikely to be driven by 
firms’ self-selection into voluntary disclosure. I examine peer firms’ online registration of later-
stage clinical trial initiation, which is public disclosure mandated by the FDA. Consistent with my 
main hypothesis, I find that a firm’s R&D investments are deterred by strong rivals’ and 
encouraged by weak rivals’ mandatory disclosures of later-stage clinical trial initiation. Another 
endogeneity concern is omitted variable bias, i.e., uncontrolled market-level characteristics could 
drive both peer disclosure and the focal firm’s R&D investments. To address this concern, I 
conduct a lead-lag analysis to examine the dynamic effects of peer disclosure. I find that the effects 
of both strong and weak rivals’ disclosures become increasingly insignificant in subsequent years 
after disclosure, consistent with product market consequences of peer disclosures fading over time 
as those disclosures become stale news and thus less decision-relevant. Next, I examine the 
moderating effect of disclosure quality. I find that peer disclosures with more specific information 
are more effective at deterring competition. Finally, I evaluate the generalizability of my findings 
using a comprehensive sample of all clinical trials registered between 2007-2018. Classifying 
firms into pharmaceutical or biotechnology firms using machine learning, I find that my key results 
are stronger for pharmaceutical and larger firms than for biotechnology and smaller firms, 
presumably because the former have more diversified R&D portfolios and thus greater leeway in 
allocating resources across R&D projects.    
My study contributes to the emerging literature on the peer effects of corporate disclosure. 
Leuz and Wysocki (2016) and Roychowdhury et al. (2019) highlight a lack of evidence on the 
effects of disclosure on peer firms’ real decisions, yet such evidence is central to the economic 
justification of disclosure regulation. Some recent studies examine the effects of financial reporting 
and patent disclosure on peer firms’ investment efficiency, market entry, and innovation (e.g., 
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Badertscher et al. 2013; Beatty et al. 2013; Breuer et al. 2019; Zou 2019; Kim and Valentine 2019; 
Hegde et al. 2019). My study adds to this literature in two ways. First, I exploit the empirical 
setting of the drug development process and measure firms’ R&D investments using the number 
of clinical trials at the firm-market-year level. This level of aggregation corresponds to the level 
of analysis at which firms generally make budgeting decisions (Cockburn and Henderson 1995). 
Compared with R&D expense and patents, clinical trials present a more welfare-relevant measure 
of pharmaceutical innovation that is directly tied to new product launch (Azoulay et al. 2019). The 
granular data of clinical trials also enable me to identify R&D races within the pharmaceutical 
industry and measure firms’ relative positions within each race. Second, drawing on game-
theoretical models of the R&D race, I hypothesize and find that a firm’s R&D investment can be 
either deterred or encouraged by peer disclosure, depending on the disclosing firms’ relative 
competitiveness in the R&D race. While most prior studies implicitly assume that disclosure 
always entails proprietary costs, my study provides a more nuanced view of the product market 
consequences of R&D disclosure. 
 
 
 8 
2.0 Related Literature  
While the accounting literature has provided substantial evidence on the capital-market 
benefits of corporate disclosure, limited evidence exists on the economic consequences of 
disclosure in the real economy. My study contributes to the emerging literature on the real effects 
of peer-firm disclosure (henceforth “peer effects of disclosure”). Besides the direct real effects of 
disclosure on the disclosing firm, the indirect effect of disclosure on peer firms is also of interest 
to regulators, as evidence on disclosure externalities is central to the economic justification of 
disclosure regulation (Leuz and Wysocki 2016).5 Dye (1990) argues that a firm’s disclosure can 
have two types of externalities: it can alter investors’ perceptions about the distributions of other 
firms’ cash flows (i.e., “financial externalities”), and possibly the actual distributions of other 
firms’ cash flows (i.e., “real externalities”). Numerous studies provide evidence on the financial 
externalities of disclosure, in the form of intra-industry information transfers around earnings 
announcements (e.g., Baginski 1987; Han et al. 1989; Han and Wild 1990). Yet, evidence on the 
real externalities of disclosures remains limited.  
Leuz and Wysocki (2016) and Roychowdhury et al. (2019) call for more research on 
whether and how a firm “learns” from peer firms’ public disclosures and changes its real decisions. 
To address the empirical challenge that corporate behavior is usually not directly observable, these 
researchers encourage future work to generate new insights by studying disclosure regulations 
 
5 I use the terms “peer effects”, “externalities”, and “spillover effects” interchangeably to indicate the effects of firms’ 
disclosures on peer firms in the same industry. 
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outside the traditional capital-market settings. My study answers their call by identifying an 
empirical setting, R&D race in drug development, in which firms’ R&D decisions are observable.  
My study also relates to archival studies on the effects of competition on voluntary 
disclosure. A large literature argues that a firm’s disclosure decisions are affected by proprietary 
cost concerns, but empirical evidence from existing studies is mixed (e.g., Beyer et al. 2010).6 For 
example, prior studies have documented that the extent of R&D disclosure (in IPO prospectuses, 
10-K, new product press release, patent disclosure) is either not associated, negatively associated, 
or positively associated with various measures of competitive pressure (e.g., Guo et al. 2004; 
Merkley 2014; Cao et al. 2018; Glaeser and Landsman 2019; Enache et al. 2020). My study 
contributes to this literature by providing evidence that competitors indeed incorporate peer firms’ 
proprietary disclosures into their real decisions. Moreover, one implication of my findings is that 
a strong (weak) firm has incentive to increase (decrease) its disclosures in anticipation of peer 
firms’ reaction. Future research can explore this hypothesis to partially reconcile the mixed 
findings.     
The remainder of this section reviews the emerging literature on the peer effects of financial 
reporting and disclosure, with a focus on R&D disclosures. 
 
6 The mixed empirical evidence is partly due to ambiguous theoretical predictions for the relation between proprietary 
costs of disclosure and market structure (Cheynel and Ziv 2020). Although most empirical studies argue that greater 
competition leads to greater proprietary costs, in the original proprietary cost hypothesis the exogenous disclosure 
costs are a reduced-form interpretation of lost competitive advantage in product markets (Verrecchia 1983; Verrecchia 
1990). 
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2.1 Peer Effects of Mandatory Financial Reporting 
Badertscher et al. (2013) provide early evidence on the effects of firms’ mandatory 
financial reporting on peer firms’ investment efficiency. They find that private firms operating in 
industries with greater public-firm presence are more responsive to industry investment 
opportunities. They interpret these results as evidence that mandatory disclosure requirements for 
public firms reduce overall industry uncertainty, leading to more efficient investment by private 
firms in the same industry.  
Using detailed data from the U.S. airline industry, Zou (2019) studies the product market 
consequences of hedge accounting disclosure. She finds that potential entrants are more likely to 
enter routes in which incumbents’ hedge accounting disclosure implies higher future production 
costs. Her results suggest that hedge accounting disclosure can shape product market competition 
by revealing firm-specific cost information to potential entrants.  
Relatedly, if managers rely on peer disclosure to evaluate investment opportunities, they 
can make distorted investment decisions when peer firms misstate their financial statements. 
Beatty et al. (2013) examine how high-profile accounting frauds affect peer firms’ investment. 
They find that peer firms increase investments during periods when the industry-leader reports 
fraudulently overstated earnings. They argue that these overstated earnings make managers of peer 
firms over-optimistic about industry outlooks, which leads them to overinvest. Li (2016) extends 
Beatty et al. (2013) by providing evidence that financial misreporting distorts not only peer firms’ 
capital expenditure decisions but also their R&D and advertising decisions. 
Several recent studies examine the effects of mandatory financial reporting on firm 
innovation. Two cross-country studies, Zhong (2018) and Brown and Martinsson (2019), find that 
firm transparency is positively associated with R&D intensity and patenting; they further argue 
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that transparency plays a role through reduced agency frictions and cost of capital. Breuer et al. 
(2019) provide causal evidence on the real effects of financial reporting regulation on corporate 
innovation activity. They exploit reporting thresholds in Europe’s regulation and an enforcement 
reform in Germany, and find that forcing a greater share of firms to publicly disclose their financial 
statements 1) reduces innovative activities at the industry level, and 2) increases firms’ reliance on 
patenting to protect innovation. Their evidence suggests that financial reporting mandates diminish 
firms’ incentives to innovate, and that these proprietary costs of disclosure are not fully 
compensated by positive information spillovers across industry peers. 
2.2 Peer Effects of R&D Disclosure 
Prior research generally does not distinguish between peer effects that arise from the 
disclosure of proprietary versus non-proprietary information (Roychowdhury et al. 2019, p.16). 
Conceptually, while some disclosures such as management earnings forecasts likely benefit peer 
firms without hurting the disclosing firm (Lang and Sul 2014), more disaggregated disclosures 
about ongoing investment projects could benefit peer firms but erode the disclosing firm’s 
competitive advantage, e.g., through knowledge spillovers.  
R&D disclosure presents a setting that manifests managerial concerns regarding 
proprietary costs, as evidenced by the industry’s opposition to disclosure mandates (e.g., IFPMA 
2009). Two recent studies provide archival evidence using mandatory patent disclosures. Hegde 
et al. (2019) study how the publication of patents affects innovation. They exploit the passage of 
the American Inventor’s Protection Act (AIPA), which accelerated the public disclosure of most 
patents in the U.S. by two years. They find that, after the passage of AIPA, 1) patents receive more 
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and faster follow-on citations, consistent with technology diffusion, and 2) technological overlap 
decreases between highly similar patents, consistent with a reduction in duplicative R&D. Using 
the same empirical setting, Kim and Valentine (2019) provide evidence that the forward citations 
of a firm’s patents increase (decrease) after AIPA in situations where the firm-specific net benefit 
of accelerated patent disclosure is likely positive (negative).  
A contemporaneous working paper by Krieger (2019) also examines how pharmaceutical 
companies adjust their R&D investments following peer disclosure of clinical trial information. 
My study differs from Krieger (2019) along three dimensions. First, the nature of peer disclosure 
is different. I study peer firms’ disclosure of clinical trial initiation, which is mandated by the FDA 
and signals interim R&D success. Krieger (2019) studies peer firms’ announcement of trial 
termination, which conveys bad news and is disclosed voluntarily. Second, we use different 
theoretical frameworks -- I draw on game-theoretical models of the R&D race, whereas Krieger 
(2019) develops a real options model. Finally, our key findings are different and complementary. 
I hypothesize and find that firms react in opposite directions to disclosures from strong and weak 
rivals within the same market. Krieger (2019) finds that firms decrease R&D investments after 
competitors’ trial termination news, especially when the terminated trial is in the same market and 
uses the same technology.    
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3.0 Hypotheses Development 
Analytical studies on disclosure decisions in a product market setting focus primarily on a 
duopoly in which firms compete on quantity (Cournot competition) or price (Bertrand 
competition). In this environment, there is common uncertainty over aggregate demand and/or 
private uncertainty over firm-specific production costs. Corporate disclosure can reduce 
uncertainty and change the rival’s production or pricing decisions. For example, in a Cournot 
duopoly, a firm’s disclosure of a high aggregate demand entails “proprietary costs” because such 
disclosure encourages the firm’s rival to increase its production, which reduces the equilibrium 
price and in turn, the disclosing firm’s profit (e.g., Darrough 1993).7  
While the Bertrand-Cournot dichotomy can capture the essence of competition in 
manufacturing or service industries, R&D competition better reflects the type of environment that 
generates proprietary information in a modern economy (Dye 2001). To establish the theoretical 
foundation for the role of proprietary information in R&D competition, I draw on game-theoretical 
models of R&D races in industrial organization (IO). The IO literature typically models the R&D 
competition as a two-stage race, in which the preliminary stage is research and the final stage is 
development. Successful completion of the preliminary stage has no intrinsic value but is a 
prerequisite for beginning work on the final stage. Two firms compete for an indivisible prize; the 
first firm to complete the final stage wins the race and receives the entire prize. A two-firm, two-
 
7 For summaries of this literature, see Verrecchia (2001), Dye (2001), Beyer et al. (2010). 
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stage R&D race involves four success rates that combine to determine firms’ probabilities of 
winning: preliminary-stage success rate of each firm, and final-stage success rate of each firm.8  
Consider the scenario in which a rival advances to the final stage when the focal firm 
remains in the preliminary stage. With a widened gap between the two firms, the focal firm will 
only continue to invest in the project if its chance of winning the race is sufficiently high.9 The 
rival’s interim success resolves the uncertainty over its preliminary-stage success rate, and the 
remaining three success rates combine to determine the focal firm’s chance of winning the race. 
Intuitively, staying in the race is more likely to be worthwhile for the focal firm if it is confident 
about succeeding in the preliminary and final stage and skeptical about the rival’s prospect of 
completing the final stage.   
A rival’s announcement of preliminary-stage completion can have two opposite effects on 
the focal firm’s investment decision.10 On the one hand, peer disclosure of interim success reduces 
the focal firm’s chance of winning, because the uncertainty over the rival’s preliminary-stage 
success rate has resolved and the technological gap between the two firms has increased. This 
effect is negative, and I call it the deterrence effect of peer disclosure. On the other hand, firms 
working on the same R&D project share the common uncertainty over project feasibility, and peer 
disclosure of interim success can signal that the preliminary stage is less difficult than expected. 
 
8 By “success rate” I mean “hazard rate” in the stochastic R&D process, which equals the conditional probability 
density of success given no success to date. Formally, denote the random discovery date of any stage of the R&D 
process by 𝜏, and assume the probability of success by a given time 𝑡 follows an exponential function: Pr(𝜏 < 𝑡) = 
1 − 𝑒−𝜆𝑡, then 𝜆 is the “hazard rate”. In models such as Choi (1991), 𝜆 is a random variable with both common and 
idiosyncratic components. 
9 More rigorously, the expected payoff from staying in the race is roughly determined by two factors, the probability 
of winning and the expected time still needed for the discovery (Choi 1991). I focus on the former factor because there 
is a lack of data on the starting time of each preliminary-stage R&D project. 
10 Theoretical models of the R&D race typically assume the perfect observability of all firms’ R&D progress. One 
exception is Bag and Dasgupta (1995), who study firm’s strategic announcement of R&D success in the initial stage. 
They establish conditions under which interim success will be announced if and only if it occurs early enough in the 
R&D race, and the rival drops out immediately upon observing this early announcement. 
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Dasgupta and Maskin (1987) describe this effect of peer disclosure as, “To know that someone has 
solved a problem is to know a great deal: specifically, that the problem is solvable.” This 
knowledge increases the focal firm’s expectation of preliminary-stage project feasibility, boosts 
the focal firm’s confidence in its own preliminary-stage success rate, and increases the focal firm’s 
expected payoff from staying in the race. This effect is positive, and I call it the encouragement 
effect of peer disclosure.11  
I hypothesize that whether the encouragement effect or the deterrence effect of peer 
disclosure dominates depends on the disclosing rival firm’s R&D efficiency, for two reasons. First, 
the deterrence effect of the rival’s disclosure of interim success stems from the rival’s final-stage 
success rate, which in turn depends on the rival’s strength. A rival that is perceived as weak may 
experience difficulty completing the final stage, which gives the focal firm opportunities to catch 
up. In contrast, a rival that appears strong is expected to succeed in the final stage within a shorter 
period, which reduces the focal firm’s chance of winning to a greater extent. Therefore, compared 
with a weak rival’s disclosure of interim success, a strong rival’s disclosure will have even greater 
deterrence effect on the focal firm - “Why compete if you can’t catch up?” (Fudenberg et al. 1983). 
Second, the encouragement effect of peer disclosure of interim success is due to the 
reduction in common uncertainty over project feasibility. I hypothesize that the focal firm’s 
updated belief about preliminary-stage project feasibility is negatively associated with the rival’s 
perceived strength, and I provide reasoning for this claim using a Bayesian updating model and a 
numerical example in Appendix B. The rival’s actual success is a function of two factors - project 
feasibility and the rival’s strength. The extent to which the focal firm attributes the rival’s success 
 
11 In addition, technical details revealed in peer disclosure can create knowledge spillovers that directly improve the 
focal firm’s R&D productivity. This scenario can also encourage the focal firm’s catch-up behavior (Bhattacharya and 
Ritter 1983; Scotchmer and Green 1990; Gill 2008). 
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to project feasibility depends on prior beliefs about the rival’s type. When the focal firm believes 
its rival to be the strong type, the interim success by the rival will be primarily attributed to such 
prior beliefs, and so the focal firm only update its beliefs about project feasibility moderately when 
it learns of the rival’s interim success. In contrast, when the rival is perceived as weak, the observed 
success is attributed to a greater extent to the alternative explanation that the preliminary stage of 
this project is relatively easy. As a result, the focal firm grows more optimistic of its own prospect 
of completing the preliminary stage soon - “If you can do that, why not me?” (Choi 1991). 
Taken together, a rival’s disclosure of interim success always has both the encouragement 
effect and the deterrence effect on the focal firm’s investment decision. A weak rival’s disclosure 
entails a strengthened encouragement effect whereas a strong rival’s disclosure entails a 
strengthened deterrence effect. I further hypothesize that the encouragement effect dominates 
when the disclosure of interim R&D success comes from a weak rival, which induces the focal 
firm to subsequently increase its R&D investment in an effort to catch up. In contrast, the 
deterrence effect likely dominates when the disclosure comes from a strong rival, which leads the 
focal firm to subsequently decrease its R&D investment. Formally, I propose the following 
hypothesis concerning a firm’s reaction to peer disclosure of interim R&D success:  
H1: A firm’s R&D investments are positively (negatively) associated with its weak (strong) 
rivals’ disclosures of interim R&D success. 
In addition to the rival firm’s R&D strength, the inherent difficulty of the R&D project 
may also moderate a firm’s reaction to peer disclosure of interim success. In particular, I 
hypothesize that the ex ante success rate of the R&D project’s final stage influences the magnitude 
of the deterrence effect of peer disclosure. As discussed earlier, the focal firm’s chance of winning 
is negatively associated with the rival’s final-stage success rate - the more likely the rival can 
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successfully reach the finish line, the less is the value to the focal firm of staying in the race. When 
the project’s final stage appears difficult, there is more likely to be sufficient time before the rival 
reaches the finish line, if he ever does. In the meantime, the focal firm should stay in the race with 
the hope of catching up with the rival. In contrast, when the final stage appears less demanding, 
the rival is expected to win within a short period, and the focal firm’s prospect of catching up with 
the rival is bleak. Comparing these two scenarios suggests that a high (low) final-stage success 
rate strengthens (alleviates) the deterrence effect of peer disclosure of interim success. Combining 
H1 and the above discussion, I propose the following hypothesis concerning the moderating effect 
of a project’s final-stage success rate: 
H2: The association between a firm’s R&D investments and its strong rivals’ disclosures 
of interim R&D success is more negative when the R&D project has a high success rate in the 
final stage.  
To simplify calculations, game-theoretical models in IO typically assume only two firms 
compete in the R&D race. Extending the theoretical predictions to a multi-firm setting, I 
hypothesize that the encouragement effect of peer disclosure of interim success is negatively 
associated with the number of firms competing in the R&D race. As discussed in H1, the 
encouragement effect of peer disclosure is driven by an updated belief about the preliminary-stage 
project feasibility and, in turn, the focal firm’s preliminary-stage success rate. To win the race, the 
focal firm needs to not only complete the preliminary stage to catch up with rivals, but also to 
finish the final stage before any other rival does. The difficulty of the latter task increases with the 
number of competitors, because the existence of more rivals makes it harder for the focal firm to 
surpass all rivals in the final stage. Intuitively, staying in the race is more beneficial when the focal 
firm becomes more optimistic about preliminary-stage project feasibility, and even more so when 
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the focal firm has fewer rivals to compete with in the final stage. Combining H1 and the above 
discussion, I propose the following hypothesis concerning the moderating effect of market 
concentration: 
H3: The association between a firm’s R&D investments and its weak rivals’ disclosures of 
interim R&D success is more positive in markets with fewer competing firms. 
The analysis so far assumes that 1) when a firm’s chance of winning drops, e.g., when it is 
deterred by strong rivals, it reduces investments or even drops out of the race, and 2) when a firm’s 
chance of winning increases, e.g., when it is encouraged by weak rivals, it stays in the race and 
invests more to catch up. Both assumptions are more likely to hold when the firm has a diversified 
R&D portfolio. Projects in similar fields share common uncertainties over project feasibility and 
thus have correlated net present values. A diversified R&D portfolio allows a firm to reallocate its 
resources from projects with a lower chance of winning to alternative projects with better prospects. 
In contrast, a firm with a focused R&D agenda may lack the flexibility to either quit a losing race 
or increase investments to catch up. Combining H1 and the above discussion, I hypothesize that a 
firm with a more diversified R&D portfolio is more responsive to new information, which 
strengthens both the encouragement effect and deterrence effect of peer disclosure: 
H4: The association between a firm’s R&D investments and its weak (strong) rivals’ 
disclosures of interim R&D success is more positive (negative) when the firm has a more 
diversified R&D portfolio.   
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4.0 Institutional Background 
The end product of pharmaceutical innovation is a new drug, which receives much more 
regulatory scrutiny than most goods. The FDA supervises the drug development process in the 
United States. Below I describe key FDA regulations regarding 1) transition through major 
milestones in drug development, and 2) disclosure of clinical trial information.  
4.1 Milestones in the Drug Development Process 
On average it takes 12 years to develop a FDA-approved new drug, with an estimated total 
capitalized R&D cost of $2.6 billion (DiMasi et al. 2016). Figure 1 illustrates the milestones in the 
drug development process, which can be divided into pre-clinical studies and clinical trials. Pre-
clinical studies collect data on a drug’s toxicity and mechanisms of action from 5-6 years of 
laboratory and animal studies. Firms usually remain secretive about their progress in pre-clinical 
studies, but disclose more information as the new drug candidate enters the clinical trial stage to 
be tested on human beings. Clinical trials are usually conducted in three phases and can take a total 
of 6-7 years to complete. The initiation of Phase 1 trial and the advancement from one phase to 
the next involve both the firm’s own cost-benefit analysis and the FDA’s formal approval. Phase 
1 trials evaluate the safety of the drug and gather early evidence of efficacy in 20-100 healthy 
volunteers. About 60-70% of drugs tested in Phase 1 trials advance to Phase 2 trials, which evaluate 
a drug’s efficacy and side-effects in 100 to 250 patients. Next, about 33% of drugs tested in Phase 
2 trials advance to Phase 3 trials, which further test the drug’s safety and efficacy in thousands of 
 20 
patients. At the end of the Phase 3 trial, the firm submits the New Drug Application (NDA) to the 
FDA for permission to market the drug in the United States. 
[Inset Figure 1 here] 
The FDA’s supervision over these major milestones allows me to use a clinical trial’s phase 
as a uniform benchmark to classify a new drug candidate’s intermediate R&D progress across 
firms and therapeutic areas. In particular, a firm’s initiation of Phase 1 trial marks its completion 
of pre-clinical studies, sending a credible signal of interim R&D success. Pre-clinical studies have 
a 98% likelihood of termination for scientific or economic reasons. In fact, firms with a higher 
termination rate in pre-clinical studies tend to have higher R&D productivity, presumably because 
their managers resist the temptation to advance projects with low probability of ultimate success 
into costly clinical trials (Ringel et al. 2013).  
4.2 Public Disclosure of Clinical Trial Information 
Until a decade ago, firms could keep all information about a clinical trial, including its very 
existence, private. In 2007 Congress passed the Food and Drug Administration Amendments Act 
(FDAAA) to address the effects of concealed negative results on medical practice and to protect 
human participants in clinical trials (Zarin et al. 2015). Section 801 of FDAAA requires sponsors 
of all “applicable trials” to register their studies, at inception, in a publicly accessible online 
database ClinicalTrials.gov.12 These “applicable trials” include controlled clinical investigations, 
 
12 ClinicalTrials.gov is the U.S. clinical trial registry website. It was created as a result of the Food and Drug 
Administration Modernization Act of 1997 and was made available to the public in 2000. The ClinicalTrials.gov 
registration requirements were expanded after Congress passed the FDAAA. Section 801 of FDAAA requires more 
types of trials to be registered and additional trial registration information to be submitted. The law also requires the 
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other than Phase 1 trials, of drugs, biological products, and devices that have at least one trial site 
in the U.S. FDAAA also included penalties for noncompliance, such as the withholding of NIH 
grant funding and civil monetary penalties. The number of registered trials on ClinicalTrials.gov 
grew from 40,000 in 2007 to 227,000 in 2016, and the website now has about 170 million page 
views per month (Zarin et al. 2017).  
Proponents of trial registration argue that it can both “foster innovation and research” and 
“reduce unnecessary duplication of trials” (World Health Organization 2018). Importantly, the 
first and second half of this statement map respectively into the encouragement effect and 
deterrence effect of peer disclosure discussed in Section 3.0. 
Potential costs of trial registration are primarily voiced by the pharmaceutical industry. For 
example, the trade association of pharmaceutical firms has expressed concerns that registering 
early-stage trials could harm the competitive advantage of the disclosing firm, which in turn hurts 
innovative efforts (IFPMA 2009). 
 
 
submission of results for certain trials. This led to the development of the ClinicalTrials.gov results database in 2008, 
which contains summary information on study participants and study outcomes.  
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5.0 Empirical Design 
5.1 Sample Selection 
My main data source is ClinicalTrials.gov, an online database where firms register their 
clinical trials to comply with FDAAA as described in Section 4.2.13 I collected all clinical trials of 
investigational drugs registered by the 50 firms with the largest number of clinical trial 
registrations on ClinicalTrials.gov between September 2007, the first month FDAAA became 
effective, and December 2017.14 These 50 firms represent the most research-active firms in the 
industry, and thus are more likely to have the resources to behave strategically.15  
The firm sponsoring a clinical trial (the “sponsor”) submits information about the trial to 
ClinicalTrials.gov when the trial begins. This data submission process is called “trial registration”. 
The sponsor is then required to update the registration information on the website throughout the 
trial, and in some cases, submit the results after the trial ends. All the self-reported information by 
the sponsor is reviewed by staff at the National Library of Medicine (NLM). The following items 
are required to be disclosed for all trial registrations: sponsor, phase, medical condition being 
treated, number/age/gender of human participants, trial start/end time, intervention, and trial status 
 
13  Firms may collect information about rivals’ clinical trials via other channels. However, ClinicalTrials.gov is 
considered the top information source for pharmaceutical industry’s competitive intelligence (e.g., Russell 2018). 
Also, given that firms comply with the FDAAA to register their Phase 2 and Phase 3 trials on ClinicalTrials.gov in a 
timely fashion, I expect ClinicalTrials.gov to be the most relevant and reliable channel for the disclosure of Phase 1 
trials as well.  
14 An investigational drug is a substance that has been approved by the FDA for testing in human participants in 
clinical trials but has not been approved for marketing. 
15 Out of the 1,223 firms with more than 10 clinical trials registered on clinicaltrials.gov, the top 50 firms contribute 
58% of all the clinical trials registered. My additional tests in section 7.3 suggest that large firms are more responsive 
to peer disclosures than smaller firms.  
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(completed, suspended, withdrawn). Figure 2 provides an example of a trial registration of 
Remdesivir, a drug candidate that treats COVID-19, on ClinicalTrials.gov. 
[insert Figure 2 here] 
Each trial registration must disclose the medical conditions treated in the trial. To facilitate 
comparison of R&D projects across firms, I classify my sample of 35,120 trials into 162 “markets”, 
according to the therapeutic areas of the medical conditions treated in each trial.16 Conceptually, 
drug candidates treating diseases in the same therapeutic area are competing in the same R&D 
race, so this classification of R&D races matches the theoretical framework of the IO models. 
Empirically, this classification allows me to measure a firm’s R&D investments and competitive 
position at the firm-market-year level, which captures R&D competition at a more granular level 
than prior studies that rely on firm-year level data.  
Specifically, to locate the position of each trial in the “tree” of diseases, I merge the medical 
condition self-reported in each trial registration with NLM’s Medical Subject Heading (MeSH) 
terms. ClinicalTrials.gov’s guidance on trial registration encourages data submitters to use the 
MeSH terminology to report the medical condition being treated in the clinical trial. MeSH 
descriptors of diseases are divided by medical experts into categories and then further divided into 
subcategories at a consistent level of specificity.  
Figure 3 provides an example of my classification of diseases into therapeutic areas. The 
“branch” or category of diseases in the figure is “Mental Disorders”, labeled [F03]. Here, I expand 
one of its multiple sub-branches, Neurocognitive Disorders, labeled [F03.615], where the added 
level indicates greater specificity. Amnesia [F03.615.200] is the even more specific descriptor 
under Neurocognitive Disorders. I define a “market” as a therapeutic area with exactly three levels 
 
16 Throughout the empirical section I use “market”, “R&D race”, and “therapeutic area” interchangeably. 
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i.e., at the sub-sub-category level in the MeSH tree system. In this example, I assume all clinical 
trials studying treatment for either “Alcoholic Korsakoff Syndrome” [F03.615.200.131] or 
“Amnesia, Anterograde” [F03.615.200.137] are competing in the market of Amnesia 
[F03.615.200].  
[insert Figure 3 here] 
My unit of observation is firm-market-year, e.g., Pzifer-Amnesia-2015 is one observation. 
This level of aggregation corresponds to the level of analysis at which firms generally make 
budgeting decisions (Cockburn and Henderson 1995). My final sample contains an unbalanced 
panel of 40,461 firm-market-year observations with non-missing values for all relevant variables. 
I run all regressions at the firm-market-year level.  
5.2 Variables and Descriptive Statistics 
To measure R&D investments at the firm-market-year level, I use the number of Phase 2 
trials that firms conduct and register online to comply with the FDAAA, consistent with recent 
studies in health economics (e.g., Finkelstein 2004; Yin 2008; Blume-Kohout and Sood 2013). 
Compared with patents, clinical trials present a more welfare-relevant measure of pharmaceutical 
innovation that is directly tied to new product launch.17 A firm’s reactions to peer disclosure, in 
the form of slowing down, abandoning, or accelerating its own early-stage R&D investments, will 
 
17 In pharmaceutical R&D, the likelihood that patents turn into products is low – firms file for patent protection on 
candidate drug compounds early in the drug discovery process, prior to starting clinical trials. Azoulay et al. (2019) 
examine the universe of 232,276 life-science patents granted to the industry by the USPTO between 1980 and 2012. 
Of these, only 4,718 patents (2%) are associated with advanced drug candidates (those in Phase 3 trials and beyond), 
and even fewer, 1,999 (<1%) are associated with FDA-approved new drugs and biologics. 
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ultimately result in changes in the number of its own trial initiations in the same market. My 
dependent variable 𝐹𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑃2𝑖,𝑘,𝑡 is an indicator variable that equals one when firm i registers at 
least one Phase 2 clinical trial in market k in year t, and zero when firm i has registered at least one 
clinical trial in year t but none of these trials is a Phase 2 trial in market k.18 
I construct my main independent variables of interest, strong and weak rivals’ disclosures 
of interim R&D success, in two steps. First, to rank firms’ R&D productivity, I measure a firm’s 
“knowledge stock” in market k at year t using the total number of Phase 2 and Phase 3 trials in 
market k the firm has initiated in the years 2007 to t-1. With FDAAA requiring firms to register 
all Phase 2 and Phase 3 trials at trial initiation, “knowledge stock” captures the firm’s accumulated 
experience in drug development that is specific to the therapeutic area.19 My regression analyses 
(untabulated) suggest that “knowledge stock” is positively associated with the firm’s subsequent 
initiation of Phase 3 trials in that market, consistent with prior findings that accumulated 
knowledge stock in the relevant therapeutic area is positively associated with gaining FDA 
approval for marketing a drug (Cockburn and Henderson 2001). Most prior accounting studies 
measure a firm’s competitive position using revenue-based market shares or R&D expenses. 
Compared with these aggregate-level measures, my measure of “knowledge stock” exploits 
granular data at the R&D project level to capture the variation in technological advantage across 
markets within a firm.20  
 
18 This construction implicitly assumes that as long as a firm is research active in a year, it is possible/feasible for it 
to conduct trials in every market. I relax this assumption when I split the sample to test H4. 
19 For robustness checks, I also measure “knowledge stock” using the cumulative number of Phase 2 trials completed 
at the firm-market-year level, the cumulative number of Phase 3 trials initiated at the firm-market-year level, or the 
cumulative number of Phase 2 and Phase 3 trials at the firm-year level. The main results remain qualitatively same. 
20 One limitation of my measure is that it only captures firms’ experience with drug development (i.e., the clinical trial 
stage) but not drug discovery (i.e., pre-clinical studies), because data on drug discovery is typically not publicly 
available. It is possible that a firm historically specialized in drug discovery in a market is perceived as a strong 
candidate in reality but is categorized as a “weak” rival under my definition. This scenario biases against my findings.     
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Next, I define a firm as a strong (weak) player in market k at year t if its “knowledge stock” 
ranks in the top (bottom) 40% within that market-year. My results are qualitatively the same if I 
use the top/bottom 30% or 50% to define strong/weak rivals. I compute strong (weak) rivals’ 
disclosures of interim R&D success, denoted 𝑅𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑃1_𝑆𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑛𝑔𝑖,𝑘,𝑡 (𝑅𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑃1_𝑊𝑒𝑎𝑘𝑖,𝑘,𝑡), as the 
total number of Phase 1 trials registered in the two years preceding t by firm i’s rivals that are 
strong (weak) players in market k. I use a two-year window to allow the focal firm sufficient time 
to respond to peer disclosure in a timely fashion.21  
To control for other determinants of 𝐹𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑃2𝑖,𝑘,𝑡  that might be correlated with peer 
disclosures of Phase 1 trial initiation, I also include the following three classes of control variables, 
all calculated using two lagged years. First, to measure firm i’s own R&D productivity in market 
k, I use the knowledge stock it recently accumulated, proxied as the number of Phase 2 and Phase 
3 trials firm i conducted in market k in the two years preceding t (𝐹𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑃23_𝑙𝑎𝑔𝑖,𝑘,𝑡). I also control 
for the number of Phase 1 trials firm i registered (𝐹𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑃1_𝑙𝑎𝑔𝑖,𝑘,𝑡 ) to allow for the natural 
transition from Phase 1 to Phase 2. Second, to capture R&D productivity by firm i’s rivals, I use 
the knowledge stock recently accumulated by them, proxied as the number of Phase 2 and Phase 
3 trials these rivals conducted in market k in the two years preceding t (𝑅𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑃23_𝑙𝑎𝑔𝑖,𝑘,𝑡). Third, 
for each market k, I include the concentration of clinical-trial market shares proxied by the 
Herfindahl index (𝐻𝐻𝐼𝑘,𝑡). Appendix A provides complete descriptions of these variables. 
Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics. The unit of observation is firm-market-year. To 
allow for two years of lagged values for explanatory variables, the sample covers years 2009 to 
 
21 If a firm in pre-clinical stage observes peer disclosure and decides to accelerate its drug development program, it 
must spend 1-3 months to plan for clinical trials and file an Investigative New Drug (IND) application to the FDA. 30 
days after filing IND, the firm may begin a Phase 1 trial unless the FDA places a hold on the study. The median length 
of a Phase 1 trial is 291 days in my sample, and the Phase 2 trial initiation typically happens a few months after the 
Phase 1 trial completion. All these time periods add up to around two years. 
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2017. The clinical trials span 162 markets, with each market corresponding to a therapeutic area 
as described in Section 5.1. Within each market-year, there are on average seven Phase 2 trials 
registered by 12 research-active firms. A typical firm observes five (two) Phase 1 trials registered 
by its strong (weak) rivals in the same market in the two preceding years.   
[insert Table 1 here] 
The correlation matrix in Table 2 suggests that 𝐹𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑃2𝑖,𝑘,𝑡 is positively associated with 
𝑅𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑃1_𝑆𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑛𝑔𝑖,𝑘,𝑡 and 𝑅𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑃1_𝑊𝑒𝑎𝑘𝑖,𝑘,𝑡. This association can be attributed to either common 
market demand factors or an aggressive reaction to peer disclosure. I next analyze this relation 
using multi-variate regression analysis.  
[insert Table 2 here] 
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6.0 Empirical Results 
6.1 Test of H1 
 To test H1, I estimate the relation between firm i’s R&D investments in market k in year 
t and its strong and weak rivals’ disclosures of Phase 1 trials in market k in the two preceding 
years. Specifically, I run the following logit regression at the firm-market-year level:  
𝐹𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑃2𝑖,𝑘,𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑅𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑃1_𝑆𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑛𝑔𝑖,𝑘,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑅𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑃1_𝑊𝑒𝑎𝑘𝑖,𝑘,𝑡 
+𝛽3𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖,𝑘,𝑡 + 𝜃𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑘,𝑡                      (1) 
In all specifications, I control for firm×year fixed effects (𝜃𝑖,𝑡).
22 Effectively, I examine the 
variation across markets within a firm-year, thus controlling for unobserved factors that are firm-
specific and/or time-varying, such as corporate disclosure policy, equity offering, merger and 
acquisition, as well as industry-level trends or shocks.23 I report the regression results in Table 3, 
with robust standard errors clustered by firm. 
  [insert Table 3 here] 
Column (1) in Table 3 presents regression results from estimating Equation (1). Consistent 
with H1, the coefficient for 𝑅𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑃1_𝑆𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑛𝑔𝑖,𝑘,𝑡  (𝛽1 ) is significantly negative, whereas the 
coefficient for 𝑅𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑃1_𝑊𝑒𝑎𝑘𝑖,𝑘,𝑡  ( 𝛽2 ) is significantly positive. In terms of economic 
significance, holding other variables constant, when strong (weak) rivals increase their disclosures 
 
22 Specifically, I estimate the model using Stata’s clogit command for conditional (fixed-effects) logistic regression. 
The results are qualitatively similar if I use a linear probability model instead of a logit model. 
23 The regression specification with firm×year fixed effects drops all observations without within-group variance of 
the dependent variable, i.e., firm-years that registered Phase 2 trials in none or all of the markets. My results are similar 
if I use firm fixed-effects and year fixed-effects instead.   
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of Phase 1 trials in the two preceding years by one standard deviation, the expected log-odds of 
the focal firm’s Phase 2 trials in the same market drop by 18.9% (increase by 15.4%). In other 
words, the focal firm’s R&D investments are deterred by strong rivals’ disclosures but encouraged 
by weak rivals’ disclosures. Regarding control variables, firm-market-years with a larger number 
of recent clinical trials conducted by either the focal firm (FocalP1_lag, FocalP23_lag) or rivals 
(RivalP23_lag) are more likely to initiate a Phase 2 trial, while those in more concentrated markets 
(higher values of HHI) are less likely to initiate a Phase 2 trial. 
To examine the overall effect of all rivals’ disclosures of interim R&D success, I construct 
another variable 𝑅𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑃1_𝑙𝑎𝑔𝑖,𝑘,𝑡, which equals the total number of Phase 1 trials registered by 
all of firm i's rivals in market k in the two years preceding t. Column (2) in Table 3 presents 
regression results from estimating Equation (1) with 𝑅𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑃1_𝑆𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑛𝑔𝑖,𝑘,𝑡 and 𝑅𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑃1_𝑊𝑒𝑎𝑘𝑖,𝑘,𝑡 
replaced by 𝑅𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑃1_𝑙𝑎𝑔𝑖,𝑘,𝑡. The negative coefficient for 𝑅𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑃1_𝑙𝑎𝑔𝑖,𝑘,𝑡 suggests that a firm’s 
R&D investments are, on average, deterred by its rivals’ disclosures of Phase 1 trials.24  
6.2 Test of H2 
To test H2, I first identify two subsamples with the highest and lowest clinical-trial success 
rate at the therapeutic-area level. To do so, I rely on results from three highly-cited biostatistics 
studies (Hay et al. 2014; Thomas et al. 2016; Wong et al. 2019). These studies estimate the 
“probability of success” (POS), i.e., the overall probability of gaining final FDA approval for 
 
24 Additional untabulated tests suggest that a firm is more likely to register its Phase 1 trial in a market when it has a 
large knowledge stock in that area and when it faces greater information demands from the capital market.   
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marketing conditional on the drug development program entering Phase 1 clinical trial. They report 
an average POS of 9.6%-13.8% for all clinical trials, but large variation in POS across therapeutic 
areas, e.g., from a minimum of 3.4% for oncology to a maximum of 33.4% for infectious disease. 
Drawing on these findings, I identify a therapeutic area as having a high (low) clinical-trial success 
rate if all three biostatistics studies rank its POS above (below) the median cross all therapeutic 
areas. Observations with high and low success rate each account for about 25% of my sample.25  
Next, I separately estimate Equation (1) for two subsamples with high and low clinical-
trial success rate and report results in Table 4. In therapeutic areas with a high success rate (Column 
1), the association between a firm’s R&D investments and its strong rivals’ disclosures, i.e., the 
coefficient for RivalP1_strong, is significantly negative, consistent with the deterrence effect of 
peer disclosure. In contrast, the same coefficient is insignificant in therapeutic areas with a low 
success rate (Column 2). Untabulated results show that the coefficients for RivalP1_strong in 
Column (1) and (2) are statistically different (p-value = 0.039), which suggests a strengthened 
deterrence effect when the transition from Phase 1 initiation all the way to final FDA approval is 
more feasible ex ante. Taken together, the results in Table 4 are consistent with H2.    
[insert Table 4 here] 
 
 
25  Therapeutic areas with low success rate include neurology or central nervous system diseases, oncology, 
autoimmune diseases, cardiovascular diseases. Therapeutic areas with high success rate include infectious disease, 
eye diseases, inflammation, hematologic diseases, allergy, gastrointestinal diseases, dermatology, urology.  
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6.3 Test of H3 
To test H3, I separately estimate Equation (1) for two subsamples partitioned on the number 
of research-active firms in a market. Table 5 reports the results. I define a market as “concentrated” 
(“dispersed”) if its number of firms with at least one trial in the preceding two years is above 
(below) the sample median.26 Consistent with H3, I find that the coefficient for weak rivals’ 
disclosures (RivalP1_weak) is significantly positive in concentrated markets (Column 2), but 
insignificant in dispersed markets (Column 1). Untabulated results show these two coefficients are 
statistically different (p-value < 0.001). Taken together, the results suggest that the encouragement 
effect of peer disclosure is strengthened when the focal firm faces a limited number of rivals in the 
R&D race.  
[insert Table 5 here] 
6.4 Test of H4 
To empirically measure the focal firm’s flexibility in resource allocation, I consider the 
following two characteristics of the firm’s R&D portfolio. First, within each firm-year, I capture 
the variation in emphasis across markets using the weight of a given market in the firm’s portfolio 
of clinical trials. I define a market as a firm’s “main focus” in a year if this market’s share of the 
firm’s total number of Phase 2 and Phase 3 trials in the last two years is above the median across 
all markets in that firm-year. Results in Columns (1) and (2) of Table 6 show that the focal firm is 
 
26 The results are similar if I split the sample using the market-year level Herfindahl index, i.e., sum of the squared 
term of each firm’s clinical-trial market share. 
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only sensitive to peer disclosure when the market is not its main focus, presumably because firms 
tend to “persevere” in their core areas of business but can be more flexible adjusting investments 
in peripheral markets. 
[insert Table 6 here] 
My second measure captures the R&D diversification strategy at the firm-year level. 
Specifically, I calculate the squared term of a market’s weight in the firm’s R&D portfolio and 
then sum the squared terms across all markets to generate a firm-year level Herfindahl index. I 
define a firm-year as having a “diversified” R&D portfolio if its Herfindahl index is below the 
sample median in that year. Results in Columns (3) and (4) of Table 6 suggest that the competitive 
consequences of peer disclosure are only salient when the focal firm has a diversified R&D 
portfolio. Taken together, regression results in Table 6 are overall consistent with H4.27   
 
 
27 Regarding the statistical significance for the difference between coefficients in Columns (1) and (2) of Table 6, 
untabulated results show that the coefficients for RivalP1_weak are not statistically different (p = 0.46), and 
coefficients for RivalP1_strong are marginally statistically different (p = 0.11). Between Columns (3) and (4), the 
coefficients for RivalP1_weak are statistically different (p = 0.05), and coefficients for RivalP1_strong are not 
statistically different (p = 0.32). 
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7.0 Additional Analyses  
7.1 Endogeneity of Peer Disclosure 
My primary analyses so far treat strong and weak rivals’ voluntary disclosure of Phase 1 
trials as the main variables of interest. Although rivals’ earlier disclosures are plausibly exogenous 
to the focal firm’s subsequent R&D investments, a potential concern is that peer disclosures are 
driven by rivals’ strategic considerations to shape competition (i.e., reverse causality) or by some 
confounding factors that influence both rivals’ past disclosure and the focal firm’s current R&D 
investments (i.e., omitted variable bias). Any alternative story needs to be able to explain why the 
focal firm’s R&D investments are negatively associated with strong rivals’ disclosures but 
positively associated with weak rivals’ disclosures, as well as why the cross-sectional results are 
consistent with my theoretical predictions in H2-H4. Nevertheless, to address this potential 
endogeneity concern, I conduct two additional analyses to further establish causality of my key 
results.  
First, I extend my analyses to strong and weak rivals’ online registrations of Phase 2 trial 
initiation, which are disclosures mandated by the FDAAA. Table 7 shows that a focal firm’s R&D 
investments, here measured by whether the firm initiates any Phase 3 trials in a market in a year, 
are negatively (positively) associated with its strong (weak) rivals’ mandatory disclosure of 
interim R&D success, measured by the number of Phase 2 trial registrations in the same market in 
the two preceding years. Therefore, results in Table 7 are consistent with H1 and qualitatively 
similar to the results in Table 3 – the deterrence (encouragement) effect of peer disclosure 
dominates when the rival is a strong (weak) player in that market, where the definitions of strong 
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and weak rivals remain the same as described in section 5.2. The fact that my main results continue 
to hold when I examine the competitive consequences of rivals’ mandatory disclosure of interim 
R&D success alleviates the concern that these results are driven by rival firms’ self-selection into 
voluntary disclosures.  
[insert Table 7 here] 
Second, market-level characteristics such as expected risk and return of R&D in that 
market could drive both peer firms’ past R&D and the focal firm’s current R&D. To address the 
concern of an omitted variable bias, I conduct a lead-lag analysis on the dynamic effects of peer 
disclosure.28 The idea of this test is to examine the effect of peer disclosure on the focal firm’s 
R&D investments in each year after the disclosure. If the documented peer effect is indeed driven 
by the focal firm’s real reaction to peer disclosure, then the magnitude of peer effects (i.e., the 
absolute value of coefficients for RivalP1_strong and RivalP1_weak) should diminish over time, 
as the disclosed information about peer firms’ R&D progress becomes outdated and less decision-
relevant. If the documented peer effects are instead driven by inherent market characteristics, then 
the coefficients for peer disclosure should remain relatively stable over time. Table 8 presents the 
results from this lead-lag analysis. Following Beatty et al. (2013), I keep all the independent 
variables (all measured over the two years before year t), but replace the original dependent 
variable measuring the focal firm’s Phase 2 initiation in year t (Column 1) with an alternative 
dummy variable that equals 1 if the focal firm initiates a Phase 2 trial in that market in year t+1 
(Column 2), t+2 (Column 3), or t+3 (Column 4). Moving from Columns (1) to (4), coefficients for 
 
28 Note that the inclusion of firm×year fixed effects in Equation (1) already controls for time-series variations such as 
demographic trends. I also include control variables that vary at the market-year level. Ideally, I would further include 
market fixed-effects to rule out market characteristics as drivers of my main results. However, variations in my 
variables of interest (RivalP1_strong and RivalP1_weak) occur mostly at the market-level, so including market fixed-
effects would wash away the variation that I want to capture.  
 35 
RivalP1_strong and RivalP1_weak become increasingly insignificant in both statistical and 
economic senses, consistent with peer effects fading over time. In contrast, all control variables 
remain significant across all columns, consistent with market-level forces having a persistent 
influence on the focal firm’s R&D decisions.    
[insert Table 8 here] 
7.2 Role of Disclosure Quality 
Conditional on the existence of peer disclosures of interim success, the specificity of 
information disclosed can moderate the effects of peer disclosure. I predict that more specific 
disclosures enhance the credibility of Phase 1 trial registration as a (costly) signal of the disclosing 
rival’s leadership, thus strengthening the deterrence effect of peer disclosure. To measure the 
specificity of peer disclosure, I use the number of words disclosed in “Outcome Measures”, a data 
item that is required by ClinicalTrials.gov at trial initiation but is claimed to be “commercially 
sensitive” by the pharmaceutical trade association (IFPMA 2009).29  
In the sample where the focal firm observes at least one peer disclosure of Phase 1 trial 
initiation in the two preceding years (i.e., 𝑅𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑃1_𝑙𝑎𝑔𝑖,𝑘,𝑡 > 0), I split the sample into three 
subsets based on the average number of words disclosed in “Outcome Measures” of rivals’ Phase 
1 trial registrations. Table 9 presents the separate estimates of Equation (1) using these three 
subsamples. Results in Column (1) show that when peer disclosures contain the largest number of 
 
29 An outcome measure is the result of a treatment or intervention that is used to objectively determine the baseline 
function of a patient at the beginning of the clinical trial. Once the treatment or intervention has commenced, the same 
instrument can be used to determine progress and efficacy. Outcome measures are measurable and will be assessed 
by a numerical value. 
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words in “Outcome Measures”, the coefficient for RivalP1_strong is significantly negative. This 
finding suggests that firms are deterred by the most informative disclosures of Phase 1 initiation 
from strong rivals. In contrast, in Columns (2)-(3), where peer disclosures reveal limited 
proprietary information, the coefficient for RivalP1_strong is less significant while the coefficient 
for RivalP1_weak becomes significantly positive, consistent with vague disclosures from weak 
rivals encouraging catch-up behavior. 
[insert Table 9 here] 
7.3 Generalizability to Other Firms 
The empirical analyses so far are based on a sample of 50 firms with the largest number of 
trial registrations on ClinicalTrials.gov. These firms are mostly publicly-listed pharmaceutical 
companies and are representative in the sense that they account for 58% of all trial registrations on 
ClinicalTrials.gov, but whether my main results generalize to other firms is an empirical question. 
To address this issue, I expand my sample to all firms that have registered at least five clinical 
trials during the 2007-2018 sample period.30 Table 10 presents results from two additional tests 
that evaluate the generalizability of my main findings.31 First, I split the expanded sample based 
on the number of clinical trials the focal firm has registered during the sample period. Specifically, 
I classify firms with more than 100 trials as large firms, between 10 and 100 trials as medium 
 
30 Specifically, I follow Capkun et al. (2019) to download a comprehensive sample of all trial registrations from the 
AACT database (https://www.ctti-clinicaltrials.org/aact-database), a publicly available database that contains all 
information (protocol and result data elements) about every trial registered in ClinicalTrials.gov. 
31 The large sample size exceeds Stata’s computational powers in estimating logit model with a large number of fixed 
effects, so I estimate a linear probability model with firm, year, and market fixed effects.   
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firms, and between 5 and 10 trials as small firms. Columns (1)-(3) in Table 10 show that the results 
in Table 3 are replicated only when the focal firm is large (Column 1), presumably because larger 
firms have a greater variety of alternative projects to invest in and thus are more responsive to peer 
disclosures.  
[insert Table 10 here] 
Second, I classify all firms in the expanded sample into either pharmaceutical or 
biotechnology firms using machine learning, following Thakor et al. (2017).32 Prior studies find 
that pharmaceutical and biotechnology firms exhibit different investment strategies, due to 
differences in risk preferences and capital constraints (e.g., Peck et al. 2015; Thakor et al. 2017). 
Columns (4)-(5) in Table 10 show that my key results apply more to pharmaceutical firms than 
biotechnology firms, presumably because the former have more diversified R&D portfolios and 
hence can be more flexible in reallocating resources. 
 
 
32 Specifically, I use the “k-means” algorithm, a popular form of cluster analysis. This algorithm places companies 
into categories based on how similar they are to each other on a host of company characteristics. Following Thakor et 
al. (2017), my algorithm starts with prototypical “seed” companies in the pharma and biotech categories, and then 
places each additional company into either category by calculating a distance between that company and the seed 
companies based upon each company’s characteristics. See the online appendix of Thakor et al. (2017) for more 
details.  
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8.0 Conclusion 
This paper studies the role of peer disclosures in shaping firms’ R&D investments. 
Drawing on game-theoretical models of R&D races in industrial organization, I hypothesize that 
a firm’s R&D investments are deterred by disclosures of interim success from strong rivals but 
encouraged by disclosures from weak rivals. Using pharmaceutical firms’ online registration of 
clinical trials in the drug development process, I find that a firm’s R&D investments in a market 
are negatively associated with the disclosures of clinical trial initiation from strong rivals, but 
positively associated with disclosures from weak rivals. To my knowledge, my findings provide 
the first empirical evidence that a firm’s reaction to peer disclosures varies with the disclosing 
firms’ relative competitiveness in the R&D race. Thus, I contribute to the emerging literature on 
the effects of corporate disclosure on peer firms’ real decisions.  
In the U.S., the FDAAA of 2007 represents a critical advance in making clinical trials of 
new treatments public knowledge. Registration of clinical trials has subsequently been mandated 
by regulators in Europe, China, Japan, Brazil, etc. Future research can provide a more 
comprehensive cost-benefit analysis of FDAAA and other disclosure regulations that promote 
transparency in the R&D process.  
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Appendix A Variable Definition 
variable unit of observation definition 
FocalP2 firm-market-year Indicator variable that equals one if the focal firm 
initiates at least one Phase 2 trials in a market in a given 
year, and zero otherwise. 
RivalP1_strong firm-market-year Number of Phase 1 trials registered in the last two years 
by the focal firm’s “strong rivals”, i.e., rivals whose 
total number of Phase 2 and Phase 3 trials registered in 
the previous two years rank above the 60th percentile 
within that market-year. 
RivalP1_weak firm-market-year Number of Phase 1 trials registered in the last two years 
by the focal firm’s “weak rivals”, i.e., rivals whose 
number of Phase 2 and Phase 3 trials registered in the 
previous two years rank below the 40th percentile 
within that market-year. 
RivalP1_lag firm-market-year Number of Phase 1 trials registered in the last two years 
by all of the focal firm’s rivals in a given market. 
RivalP23_lag firm-market-year Number of Phase 2 and Phase 3 trials registered in the 
last two years by the focal firm's rivals in a market. 
FocalP1_lag firm-market-year Number of a firm’s Phase 1 trials registered in a market 
during the previous two years.  
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FocalP23_lag firm-market-year Number of a firm’s Phase 2 and Phase 3 trials 
registered in a market during the previous two years. 
HHI market-year Herfindahl index, calculated as the sum of squared 
terms of each firm’s clinical trial market share (a firm’s 
FocalP23_lag divided by the total FocalP23_lag in 
market-year). 
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Appendix B A Bayesian Updating Model of the Encouragement Effect of Peer Disclosure 
In a static model, assume that the outcome of the preliminary stage is binary. Denote the 
event that firm 𝑖 has succeeded in the preliminary stage as 𝑆𝑖 = 1. Suppose the probability of 
success in the preliminary stage for firm 𝑖 is 𝜆𝑖. That is: 𝑆𝑖 = 1 with probability 𝜆𝑖, where 𝜆𝑖 =
?̅? + 𝜖𝑖, and 𝑆𝑖 = 0 with probability 1 − 𝜆𝑖.  
The firm-project specific success rate, 𝜆𝑖, is a combination of project feasibility (?̅?), which 
is a common uncertainty for both firms, and firm type (𝜖𝑖), which is idiosyncratic.
33 Without loss 
of generalizability, assume both ?̅? and 𝜖𝑖 follow Bernoulli distributions, with probabilities 𝑝 and 
𝑞𝑖 of getting a high value, respectively: ?̅? =  𝜆𝐻 with probability 𝑝, and 𝜆𝐿 with probability 1 − 𝑝; 
𝜖𝑖 =  𝜖𝐻 with probability 𝑞𝑖 , and 𝜖𝐿 with probability 1 − 𝑞𝑖. Assume 𝜖𝐻 + 𝜆𝐻 < 1, 0 < 𝜖𝐿 < 𝜖𝐻, 
0 < 𝜆𝐿 < 𝜆𝐻, and firms’ types are independent, i.e., 𝜖𝑖⊥𝜖𝑗. 
Claim 1: 
𝐸(?̅?|𝑆𝑗 = 1) > 𝐸(?̅?). 
This result suggests that a firm always revises upward its belief about project feasibility 
after observing a rival’s disclosure of interim success. That is, peer disclosure always has a 
(positive) encouragement effect on the focal firm. 
Proof: 
𝐸[?̅?|𝑆𝑗 = 1] = Pr(?̅? = 𝜆𝐻|𝑆𝑗 = 1) ∙ 𝜆𝐻 + Pr(?̅? = 𝜆𝐿|𝑆𝑗 = 1) ∙ 𝜆𝐿 
=
Pr (?̅? = 𝜆𝐻, 𝑆𝑗 = 1)
Pr (𝑆𝑗 = 1)
𝜆𝐻 +
Pr (?̅? = 𝜆𝐿 , 𝑆𝑗 = 1)
Pr (𝑆𝑗 = 1)
𝜆𝐿 
 
33 “Project feasibility” is broad-defined here. 𝜆̅ represents the easiness of the project conditional on it being doable.    
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=
𝐴
𝐴 + 𝐴′
𝜆𝐻 +
𝐴′
𝐴 + 𝐴′
𝜆𝐿 
where 𝐴 = Pr(?̅? = 𝜆𝐻, 𝑆𝑗 = 1) = Pr(?̅? = 𝜆𝐻) ∙ Pr(𝑆𝑗 = 1|?̅? = 𝜆𝐻) , and 𝐴
′ = Pr(?̅? =
𝜆𝐿 , 𝑆𝑗 = 1) = Pr(?̅? = 𝜆𝐿) ∙ Pr(𝑆𝑗 = 1|?̅? = 𝜆𝐿). 
Recall the unconditional probabilities are Pr(𝑆𝑗 = 1) = ?̅? + 𝜖𝑗 , Pr(?̅? = 𝜆𝐻) = 𝑝 , and 
Pr(?̅? = 𝜆𝐿) = 1 − 𝑝. Therefore, 
𝐴 = 𝑝 ∙ 𝐸[?̅? + 𝜖𝑗|?̅? = 𝜆𝐻] = 𝑝 ∙ [𝜆𝐻 + 𝑞𝑗𝜖𝐻 + (1 − 𝑞𝑗)𝜖𝐿]. 
𝐴′ = (1 − 𝑝) ∙ 𝐸[?̅? + 𝜖𝑗|?̅? = 𝜆𝐿] = (1 − 𝑝) ∙ [𝜆𝐿 + 𝑞𝑗𝜖𝐻 + (1 − 𝑞𝑗)𝜖𝐿]. 
Since 𝐸(?̅?) = 𝑝𝜆𝐻 + (1 − 𝑝)𝜆𝐿 , to show 𝐸(?̅?|𝑆𝑗 = 1) > 𝐸(?̅?) it suffices to show that 
𝐴
𝐴+𝐴′
> 𝑝.  
𝐴
𝐴 + 𝐴′
− 𝑝 =
𝑝 ∙ [𝜆𝐻 + 𝑞𝑗𝜖𝐻 + (1 − 𝑞𝑗)𝜖𝐿] − 𝑝 ∙ [𝑝𝜆𝐻 + (1 − 𝑝)𝜆𝐿 + 𝑞𝑗𝜖𝐻 + (1 − 𝑞𝑗)𝜖𝐿]
𝐴 + 𝐴′
∝ 𝜆𝐻 − (𝑝𝜆𝐻 + (1 − 𝑝)𝜆𝐿) > 0. 
Therefore, 𝐸(?̅?|𝑆𝑗 = 1) > 𝐸(?̅?). 
Claim 2: 
𝜕𝐸(?̅?|𝑆𝑗 = 1)
𝜕𝑞𝑗
< 0. 
This result suggests that the extent of belief revision about project feasibility is negatively 
associated with the rival’s perceived strength. Specifically, when the rival firm j is expected to be 
stronger (higher value of 𝑞𝑗 ), the focal firm’s posterior belief about project feasibility is less 
optimistic, i.e., 𝐸(?̅?|𝑆𝑗 = 1) is lower. Intuitively, when the rival is expected to be stronger, the 
rival’s interim success (𝑆𝑗 = 1) will be attributed more to the focal firm’s prior belief that 𝜖𝑗 is a 
high value. In contrast, when the rival is expected to be weak (lower value of 𝑞𝑗), the rival’s interim 
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success will be attributed to a greater extent to the alternative explanation that the project is 
relatively easy (?̅? =  𝜆𝐻).  
Proof:  
Follow the previous proof and take partial derivatives over 𝑞𝑗 to get 
𝜕𝐴
𝜕𝑞𝑗
= 𝑝(𝜖𝐻 − 𝜖𝐿) and 
𝜕𝐴′
𝜕𝑞𝑗
= (1 − 𝑝)(𝜖𝐻 − 𝜖𝐿). Therefore, 
𝜕𝐸[?̅?|𝑆𝑗 = 1]
𝜕𝑞𝑗
=
𝜕
𝜕𝑞𝑗
(
𝐴
𝐴 + 𝐴′
𝜆𝐻 +
𝐴′
𝐴 + 𝐴′
𝜆𝐿) 
∝ 𝜆𝐻 ∙ [𝑝(𝜖𝐻 − 𝜖𝐿)(𝐴 + 𝐴
′) − 𝐴(𝜖𝐻 − 𝜖𝐿)] + 𝜆𝐿 ∙ [(1 − 𝑝)(𝜖𝐻 − 𝜖𝐿)(𝐴 + 𝐴
′) − 𝐴′(𝜖𝐻 − 𝜖𝐿)] 
< 𝜆𝐻 ∙ [𝑝(𝜖𝐻 − 𝜖𝐿)(𝐴 + 𝐴
′) − 𝐴(𝜖𝐻 − 𝜖𝐿)] + 𝜆𝐻 ∙ [(1 − 𝑝)(𝜖𝐻 − 𝜖𝐿)(𝐴 + 𝐴
′) − 𝐴′(𝜖𝐻 − 𝜖𝐿)] 
= (𝜖𝐻 − 𝜖𝐿)(𝐴 + 𝐴
′) − (𝜖𝐻 − 𝜖𝐿)(𝐴 + 𝐴
′) = 0. 
A numerical example: 
Let 𝜆𝐻 = 𝜖𝐻 = 0.45,  𝜆𝐿 = 𝜖𝐿 = 0.05, 𝑝 = 0.5. Assume the threshold level preliminary-
stage success rate is 𝜆𝑖
∗ = 0.5. Below this level the firm should drop out. Suppose the firm’s priors 
are: 𝐸(?̅?) = 0.25 and 𝜖𝑖 = 0.15.  
When the rival is expected to be strong (𝑞𝑗 = 0.9), the focal firm’s updated belief about 
project feasibility is 𝐸(?̅?|𝑆𝑗 = 1) =
Pr (?̅?=𝜆𝐻,𝑆𝑗=1)
Pr (𝑆𝑗=1)
𝜆𝐻 +
Pr (?̅?=𝜆𝐿,𝑆𝑗=1)
Pr (𝑆𝑗=1)
𝜆𝐿 = 0.311 , so the focal 
firm’s updated preliminary-stage success rate is 𝜆𝑖′ = 0.311 + 0.15 = 0.461 < 𝜆𝑖
∗. It should drop 
out.     
When the rival is expected to be weak (𝑞𝑗 = 0.1), the focal firm’s updated belief about 
project feasibility is 𝐸(?̅?|𝑆𝑗 = 1) =
Pr (?̅?=𝜆𝐻,𝑆𝑗=1)
Pr (𝑆𝑗=1)
𝜆𝐻 +
Pr (?̅?=𝜆𝐿,𝑆𝑗=1)
Pr (𝑆𝑗=1)
𝜆𝐿 = 0.383 , so the focal 
firm’s updated preliminary-stage success rate is 𝜆𝑖
′ = 0.383 + 0.15 = 0.533 > 𝜆𝑖
∗ . It should 
continue the race.  
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Figures & Tables 
 
Figure 1. The Drug Development Process 
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Figure 2. An Example of Clinical Trial Registration on ClinicalTrials.gov (Excerpt)  
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Figure 3. An Example of the MeSH Tree of Diseases -- Branch “Mental Disorders [F3]”  
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Table 1. Descriptive Statistics 
 
Variable N Mean Std 
Dev 
1st 
Pctl 
25th 
Pctl 
Median 75th 
Pctl 
99th 
Pctl 
FocalP2 40,461 0.121 0.326 0 0 0 0 1 
RivalP1_strong 40,461 5.003 6.768 0 0 2 7 35 
RivalP1_weak 40,461 2.192 2.446 0 0 1 3 12 
HHI 40,461 0.247 0.126 0.081 0.156 0.219 0.316 0.75 
FocalP1_lag 40,461 0.22 0.692 0 0 0 0 4 
FocalP23_lag 40,461 0.704 1.823 0 0 0 0 11 
RivalP23_lag 40,461 24.181 24.583 2 7 14 35 127 
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Table 2. Correlation Matrix 
 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
(1) FocalP2 
 
0.177 0.131 -0.186 0.360 0.457 0.216 
 
        
(2) RivalP1_strong 0.163 
 
0.457 -0.462 0.209 0.197 0.753 
 
        
(3) RivalP1_weak 0.126 0.475 
 
-0.337 0.162 0.145 0.472 
 
        
(4) HHI -0.156 -0.352 -0.291 
 
-0.171 -0.260 -0.660 
 
        
(5) FocalP1_lag 0.362 0.218 0.173 -0.136 
 
0.463 0.221 
 
        
(6) FocalP23_lag 0.484 0.244 0.187 -0.174 0.567 
 
0.236 
 
        
(7) RivalP23_lag 0.208 0.862 0.484 -0.460 0.236 0.279 
 
 
Numbers below the diagonal indicate Pearson correlation coefficients. Numbers above 
diagonal indicate Spearman correlation coefficients. Numbers in bold indicate p-value <1%.  
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Table 3. The Effects of Rivals’ Disclosure of Phase 1 Trials on the Focal Firm’s R&D 
Investments (Test of H1) 
 
    (1) (2) 
VARIABLES 
pred.  
FocalP2 FocalP2 
sign 
    
RivalP1_strong - -0.023***  
 
 [0.001]  
RivalP1_weak + 0.022**  
  [0.041]  
RivalP1_lag ?  -0.011** 
   [0.034] 
FocalP1_lag  0.346*** 0.348*** 
  [0.001] [0.001] 
FocalP23_lag  0.331*** 0.333*** 
  [0.001] [0.001] 
RivalP23_lag  0.013*** 0.012*** 
  [0.001]  [0.001] 
HHI  -2.860*** -2.966*** 
  [0.001] [0.001] 
    
Observations  36,668 36,668 
Cluster SE  firm firm 
Fixed effects   firm×year firm×year 
 
This table presents results from logit regressions at the firm-year-market level. The 
dependent variable is FocalP2, an indicator variable that equals one if the focal firm initiates at 
least one Phase 2 trials in a market in a year, and zero otherwise. All other variables are defined in 
Appendix A. All regressions include firm×year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered by firm. 
P-values are in brackets. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, 
respectively, for a two-tailed t-test. 
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Table 4. Sample Split by Clinical Trial Success Rate (Test of H2) 
 
      (1) (2) 
 
 pred.  clinical-trial success rate 
VARIABLES sign high low 
         
RivalP1_strong - -0.040** -0.001  
  [0.019] [0.953] 
RivalP1_weak + 0.034 0.030*  
  [0.177] [0.057] 
FocalP1_lag  0.276*** 0.380***  
  [0.001] [0.001] 
FocalP23_lag  0.392*** 0.381***  
  [0.001] [0.001] 
HHI   -1.293** -2.626***  
  [0.024] [0.001] 
RivalP23_lag  0.026*** 0.016*** 
 
  [0.001] [0.001]  
   
 
Observations  8,388 8,094 
Cluster 
SE 
  firm firm 
Fixed effects   firm×year firm×year 
 
This table presents results from logit regressions at the firm-year-market level. The 
dependent variable is FocalP2, an indicator variable that equals one if the focal firm initiates at 
least one Phase 2 trials in a market in a year, and zero otherwise. All other variables are defined in 
Appendix A. Columns 1-2 are based on two subsamples partitioned by the “probability of success” 
(POS), i.e., the overall probability of gaining final FDA approval for marketing conditional on the 
drug development program entering Phase 1 clinical trial. Specifically, I identify a therapeutic area 
as having a high (low) clinical-trial success rate if all three biostatistics studies (Hay et al. 2014; 
Thomas et al. 2016; Wong et al. 2019) rank its POS above (below) the median cross all therapeutic 
areas. All regressions include firm×year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered by firm. P-
values are in brackets. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively, 
for a two-tailed t-test. 
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Table 5. Sample Split by Number of Competing Firms in a Market (Test of H3) 
 
    (1) (2) 
  Dispersed market Concentrated market 
VARIABLES pred. sign  (n_firm >8) (n_firm <=8) 
        
RivalP1_strong - -0.004 -0.043** 
 
 [0.564] [0.033] 
RivalP1_weak + -0.011 0.079*** 
  [0.289] [0.002] 
FocalP1_lag  0.278*** 0.448*** 
  [0.001] [0.001] 
FocalP23_lag  0.279*** 0.499*** 
  [0.001] [0.001] 
HHI  -2.236*** -0.621 
  [0.003] [0.160] 
RivalP23_lag  0.005** 0.013 
  [0.020] [0.161] 
    
Observations  15,115 17,515 
Cluster SE  firm firm 
FE   firm×year firm×year 
 
This table presents results from logit regressions at the firm-year-market level. The 
dependent variable is FocalP2, an indicator variable that equals one if the focal firm initiates at 
least one Phase 2 trials in a market in a year, and zero otherwise. All other variables are defined in 
Appendix A. Columns 1-2 are based on two subsamples partitioned by number of research-active 
firms (firms with at least one trials in the two preceding years) in a market. All regressions include 
firm×year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered by firm. P-values are in brackets. *, **, *** 
indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively, for a two-tailed t-test. 
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Table 6. Sample Split by Focal Firm’s Diversification Strategy (Test of H4) 
 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  
Is this market the focal firm’s main 
focus? 
Is the focal firm 
diversified? 
VARIABLES 
pred. 
yes no no yes 
sign 
           
RivalP1_strong - -0.014* -0.040*** -0.015 -0.028*** 
 
 [0.088] [0.008] [0.115] [0.002] 
RivalP1_weak + 0.017 0.059** -0.007 0.037*** 
  [0.104] [0.018] [0.724] [0.002] 
FocalP1_lag  0.261*** 0.543*** 0.389*** 0.313*** 
  [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] 
FocalP23_lag 0.192*** 0.212*** 0.632*** 0.466*** 
  [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] 
RivalP23_lag 0.009*** 0.010*** 0.019*** 0.008*** 
  [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] 
HHI  -2.069*** -2.405*** -3.238*** -2.609*** 
  [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] 
      
Observations 11,742 19,028 17,402 18,839 
Cluster SE  firm firm firm firm 
Fixed effects   firm×year firm×year firm×year firm×year 
 
This table presents results from logit regressions at the firm-year-market level. The 
dependent variable is FocalP2, an indicator variable that equals one if the focal firm initiates at 
least one Phase 2 trials in a market in a year, and zero otherwise. All other variables are defined in 
Appendix A. Columns (1)-(2) are based on two subsamples partitioned by whether the market is 
the focal firm’s focused area, i.e., with share of Phase 2 and Phase 3 trials above median among 
all markets for that firm-year. Columns (3)-(4) are based on two subsamples partitioned by whether 
the focal firm is diversified, i.e., with a firm-year level Herfindahl index (sum of the squared term 
of each market’s share of Phase 2and Phase 3 trials) below median in a given year. All regressions 
include firm×year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered by firm. P-values are in brackets. *, 
**, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively, for a two-tailed t-test. 
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Table 7. Effects of Rivals’ Mandatory Disclosure of Phase 2 Trials 
 
   (1) (2) 
VARIABLES 
pred. 
sign 
FocalP3 FocalP3 
        
RivalP2_strong - -0.014***  
  [0.002]  
RivalP2_weak + 0.098***  
  [0.001]  
RivalP2_lag ?  -0.002 
   [0.571] 
FocalP1_lag  0.518*** 0.539*** 
  [0.001] [0.001] 
FocalP2_lag  0.385*** 0.374*** 
  [0.001] [0.001] 
HHI  -2.840*** -2.949*** 
  [0.001] [0.001] 
    
Observations  41,005 37,752 
Cluster SE  firm firm 
FE   firm×year firm×year 
 
This table presents results from logit regressions at the firm-year-market level. The 
dependent variable is FocalP3, an indicator variable that equals one if the focal firm initiates at 
least one Phase 3 trials in a market in a year, and zero otherwise. All other variables are defined in 
Appendix A. All regressions include firm×year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered by firm. 
P-values are in brackets. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, 
respectively, for a two-tailed t-test. 
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Table 8. Lead-Lag Analysis of the Dynamic Effects of Peer Disclosure 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES FocalP2 FocalP2_lead1 FocalP2_lead2 FocalP2_lead3 
          
RivalP1_strong -0.022*** -0.023** -0.016 -0.014 
 [0.001] [0.013] [0.131] [0.229] 
RivalP1_weak 0.022** 0.005 0.007 -0.007 
 [0.043] [0.708] [0.631] [0.663] 
FocalP1_lag 0.342*** 0.300*** 0.260*** 0.251*** 
 [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.001] 
FocalP23_lag 0.325*** 0.265*** 0.213*** 0.176*** 
 [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
HHI -2.845*** -2.743*** -2.901*** -3.300*** 
 [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
RivalP23_lag 0.013*** 0.014*** 0.012*** 0.012*** 
 [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
 
    
Observations 36,668 32,406 27,956 23,482 
Cluster SE firm firm firm firm 
FE firm×year firm×year firm×year firm×year 
 
This table presents results from logit regressions at the firm-year-market level. From 
Column 1 to 4, the dependent variables are dummy variables that equal to 1 if the focal firm 
initiates a Phase 2 trial in that market in year t (Column 1), in year t+1 (Column 2), in year t+2 
(Column 3), or in year t+3 (Column 4). All other variables are defined in Appendix A. All 
regressions include firm×year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered by firm. P-values are in 
brackets. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively, for a two-
tailed t-test. 
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Table 9. Sample Split by Disclosure Quality  
 
  (1) (2) (3) 
 Average amount of sensitive information disclosed 
VARIABLES high medium low 
        
RivalP1_strong -0.020** -0.012* -0.000 
 [0.044] [0.060] [0.986] 
RivalP1_weak -0.044* 0.051*** 0.057** 
 [0.067] [0.004] [0.041] 
FocalP1_lag 0.305*** 0.402*** 0.611*** 
 [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] 
FocalP23_lag 0.274*** 0.332*** 0.485*** 
 [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] 
HHI -2.517*** -2.881*** -2.964*** 
 [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] 
RivalP23_lag 0.009*** 0.015*** 0.021*** 
 [0.002] [0.001] [0.001] 
    
Observations 10,300 10,621 8,412 
Cluster SE firm firm firm 
FE firm×year firm×year firm×year 
 
This table presents results from logit regressions at the firm-year-market level. The 
dependent variable is FocalP2, an indicator variable that equals one if the focal firm initiates at 
least one Phase 2 trials in a market in a year, and zero otherwise. All other variables are defined in 
Appendix A. Columns 1-3 are based on three subsamples partitioned by amount of sensitive 
information disclosed in Phase 1 trial registration, defined as the number of words disclosed in the 
data item “Outcome Measures” averaged across all rivals’ Phase 1 trial registrations. All 
regressions include firm×year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered by firm. P-values are in 
brackets. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively, for a two-
tailed t-test. 
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Table 10. Generalizability to Other Firms 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 focal firm’s number of trial registrations k-means classification 
 Large Small Medium Pharmaceutical Biotechnology 
RivalP1_strong -0.001* -0.000 0.000 -0.001*** 0.000 
 [0.070] [0.712] [0.492] [0.004] [0.924] 
RivalP1_weak 0.002*** 0.001** 0.001*** 0.001** 0.000* 
 [0.001] [0.010] [0.001] [0.012] [0.070] 
FocalP1_lag 0.119*** 0.073*** 0.061*** 0.133*** 0.066*** 
 [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] 
FocalP23_lag 0.039*** 0.027*** 0.060*** 0.039*** 0.067*** 
 [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] 
HHI -0.173*** -0.033*** -0.034*** -0.156*** -0.035*** 
 [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] 
RivalP23_lag 0.001*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
 [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] 
      
Observations 122,424 95,948 315,559 97,697 106,369 
Cluster SE firm firm firm firm firm 
Fixed effects firm, year, market firm, year, market firm, year, market firm, year, market firm, year, market 
 
This table presents results from OLS regressions at the firm-year-market level. The 
dependent variable is FocalP2, an indicator variable that equals one if the focal firm initiates at 
least one Phase 2 trials in a market in a year, and zero otherwise. All other variables are defined in 
Appendix A. Columns (1)-(3) are based on three subsamples partitioned by number of clinical 
trials registered by the focal firm, with 10 and 100 being the cutoff values. Columns (4)-(5) are 
based on two subsamples partitioned by whether the focal firm is a pharmaceutical firm or 
biotechnology firm, classified using a k-means algorithm following Thakor et al. (2017). All 
regressions include firm, year, market fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered by firm. P-values 
are in brackets. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively, for a 
two-tailed t-test. 
 
 
 
